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What Do Lawyers Contribute to Law and 
Economics? 
Robert E. Scott† & George G. Triantis†† 
The law-and-economics movement has transformed the analysis of 
private law in the United States and, increasingly, around the world. As 
the field developed from 1970 to the early 2000s, scholars have developed 
countless insights about the operation and effects of law and legal institu-
tions. Throughout this period, the discipline of law-and-economics has 
benefited from a partnership among trained economists and academic law-
yers. Yet the tools that are used derive primarily from economics and not 
law. A logical question thus demands attention: what role do academic law-
yers play in law-and-economics scholarship? In this Essay, we offer an in-
terpretive theory of the practice of law-and-economics scholarship over the 
past 50 years that recognizes the distinct methodological tools of the aca-
demic lawyer. We claim that, in addition to the legal resources they provide 
to the economic analyst, academic lawyers have cognizable analytical 
skills, developed through their involvement in law as an applied discipline 
and their mastery of the common lawʼs analogical method of argument. 
We draw on the idea of analogical argument to explain some of the differ-
ences in the ways that economists and lawyers analyze some of the building 
blocks of our economy, including the relationship between formal and in-
formal modes of enforcement and the reasons why inefficient boilerplate 
terms persist in certain standardized contracts. By enriching the standard 
economic model with insights from other disciplines and clarifying the con-
nections among these disciplines, the lawyer provides skills that are criti-
cally important for advancing normative claims. 
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The law-and-economics movement has transformed the analysis of 
private law in the United States and, increasingly, around the world. Start-
ing with just a few adherents fifty years ago, it is now a fixture in fields of 
scholarship such as business law, contracts, torts, and property. Scholars in 
these and other fields of law are, without exception, familiar with the basic 
tools of marginalist analysis, game theory, problems of private information 
and rational choice under scarcity and uncertainty. As the interdisciplinary 
enterprise developed from 1970 to the early 2000s, legal scholars drew on 
methods from economics to develop countless insights about the operation 
and effects of law and legal institutions, thereby permitting policy makers 
to better understand the legal and social order. Within the past 20 years, a 
new generation of lawyer-economists have applied economic methods to 
derive testable hypotheses subject to increasingly rigorous empirical anal-
ysis. Throughout this period, the discipline of law-and-economics has ben-
efited from a partnership among trained economists and academic lawyers. 
Yet one cannot help noticing that the tools just described derive primarily 
from theoretical and empirical economics and not law. A logical question 
thus demands attention: what role do academic lawyers play in law-and-
economics scholarship? We take the opportunity presented by this Sympo-
sium on future challenges to law-and-economics to address that question.1 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 1. In his dinner remarks after delivering the John M. Olin Lecture at the University of 
Virginia School of Law in 1994, Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen was asked whether and how legal 
academics will be useful in law-and-economics. Professor Sen related a story of a visit to Thailand 
where he had been invited to give a lecture. After checking into his hotel, he decided to go to the 
market down the street to buy some food. He asked the hotel desk clerk for rules of thumb in 
bargaining over the price and was told that the merchant’s starting bid is typically at least twice as 
expensive as his reservation price. Sen proceeded to the banana stand and asked how much he 
could buy for $1 and was told that he could buy four. Remembering the advice of the hotel clerk, 
Sen countered with eight bananas. Eventually, they reached a deal of seven. Proud that he had 
bargained skillfully, Sen was nevertheless shocked when the merchant handed over seven bundles 
of bananas, rather than seven bananas. In his inimitable gracious fashion, Sen complemented law-
yers for reminding economists to take care to understand the context of what they are modeling 
or measuring. See also Pamela S. Karlan, Answering Questions, Questioning Answers, and the 
Roles of Empiricism in the Law of Democracy, 65 STAN L. REV. 1269, 1271 (2013) (“A central 
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We can best frame our inquiry by beginning with a few uncontrover-
sial assumptions. First, academic lawyers know the law (whether statutes, 
regulations or common law doctrines) and the process by which courts and 
other legal institutions operate. Thus, lawyers are, at a minimum, an inval-
uable resource for anyone doing economic analysis of law.2 The more chal-
lenging question is whether lawyers have methodological skills beyond 
their knowledge of the law that add value to the scholarly project. Second, 
law is not an autonomous academic discipline.3 Law is to the social sciences 
and the humanities what engineering is to the natural sciences: like engi-
neering, law is an applied or translational discipline, in both its normative 
and positive modes of analysis. Many of the analytic methods used by a 
prototypical academic lawyer are borrowed from other disciplines, includ-
ing psychology, history, sociology, philosophy, and economics. 
While several leading law-and-economics scholars have written that 
the field is simply the trade of applying economic methods to legal 
knowledge,4 we offer an alternative claim that legal academics make sig-
nificant methodological contributions to law and economics scholarship. 
On its face, that may not seem like a very controversial claim. Many would 
agree that academic lawyers contribute more to this enterprise than their 
deep knowledge of law and the institutions within which law functions. In 
doing so, these observers may remark, for example, that lawyers “ask the 
right questions,” or “solve difficult problems,” “better understand policy 
goals,” or “add complexity to the economist’s simplifying assumptions.”5 
But the conclusory nature of these observations suggests that identifying 
the distinctive skills of the academic lawyer is a difficult task, in large part 
because legal skills have so much of the character of tacit knowledge. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
contribution that lawyers . . . have brought to scholarship on the law of democracy has been pre-
cisely their professional experience and a qualitative sensibility derived from that experience—
what Karl Llewellyn long ago called ‘situation sense.’” (citation omitted)). 
 2. We note here the distinction drawn by Judge Guido Calabresi between the “economic 
analysis of law” and “law-and-economics,” to which we will return. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE 
FUTURE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN REFORM AND RECOLLECTION (2016). See infra 
text accompanying notes 27-29. 
 3. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-
1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987). 
 4. A number of scholars have advanced this thesis. See, e.g., George L. Priest, Social 
Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as University, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 437, 439 
(1983). Priest argued that “[t]he lawyer-economist[s’] . . . education teaches him that his training 
is obsolete and that the more he develops his scientific interest, the more obsolete his basic train-
ing—legal training—will become.” Henry Hansmann has offered a similar, albeit less trenchant 
view of the similarity between economics scholarship and law-and-economics scholarship. He sees 
law and economics as simply economics written by or for lawyers—no different in substance or 
methodology, only in audience and impact. Henry Hansmann, The Current State of Law-and-
Economics Scholarship, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 217, 218 (1983) (“[L]aw-and-economics . . . does not 
stand out from the rest of economics scholarship in terms of either methodology or subject mat-
ter.”). In fairness to Priest and Hansmann, their perceptions of law-and-economics were offered 
nearly 40 years ago, and the field (and the lawyer’s role) has advanced since then. We do not know 
if they would still challenge the argument that we offer in this Essay. 
 5. Each of these statements attempting to describe the contributions of academic lawyers 
were offered by participants at the Conference on New Challenges for Law and Economics on 
September 11-12, 2020. 
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We set out in this Essay to unpack this tacit knowledge. We offer an 
interpretive theory of law and economics scholarship over the past 50 years 
that incorporates the specific methodological skills of the academic law-
yer.6 Our central claim is that, in addition to the legal resources they pro-
vide to the economic analyst, academic lawyers also contribute cognizable 
analytical skills developed both through their involvement in law as an ap-
plied discipline and their mastery of the analogical method of argument 
used in common-law analysis.7 Whether used in isolation or combined with 
economic methods, these skills add value to our understanding of the world 
that a talented economist per se could not provide herself. 
Law schools have long been the primary home in universities for mul-
tidisciplinary analysis. Legal academics, particularly those trained in the 
legal realist tradition, have long adapted tools to analyze legal issues from 
a number of social sciences—economics, political science, psychology, and 
sociology, to name four—and the humanities—history, philosophy, and lit-
erary analysis. When legal academics have applied economics to law, they 
have done so against a backdrop that is much more ecumenical than that 
of their economist counterparts. In law schools, the norms of economic 
analysis are constantly challenged from the perspectives of other disci-
plines, and exposure to this tension often distinguishes the law-and-eco-
nomics works authored by legal academics. 
In addition, law-and-economics scholarship is influenced by the com-
mon law training of legal academics, at least in the Anglo-American juris-
dictions. The common-law method is essentially inductive in extracting 
from legal cases and opinions the set of factors that are essential to a legal 
result. This process of generalizing from the particular in order to find sim-
ilarity across cases requires a sophisticated form of analogical reasoning in 
order to determine which similarities are relevant and which are not. As 
generations of legal realists have noted, however, there is a looseness to 
such analogical reasoning, often driven by normative goals. Importantly, 
lawyers use analogy in a particular way—as part of an adversarial process 
in which one analogy is always contrasted with another in opposition. This 
contestation refines the skill of using analogies as tools to harness different 
perspectives and policy goals. We conjecture that this type of analogical 
reasoning works synergistically with the logical rigor of economic analysis, 
whether in the framing of theoretical models or in strict causal inference in 
econometrics. 
In sum, the legal academics’ methodological contribution to law-and-
economics is a toolbox that combines analogical argument with the per-
spectives gained from the range of social sciences and humanities. These 
tools are used to enrich the explanatory and normative theories of ob-
served legal phenomena provided by economists. We begin in Part I of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 6. Other essays in this Issue address empirical legal studies, so we focus primarily on the 
non-empirical vein of law-and-economics. 
 7. In this respect, we build on arguments previously made in CALABRESI, supra note 2. 
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Essay with a brief descriptive account of the differences between the disci-
plines of economics and academic law, and then outline how one might 
expect these comparative advantages to meld in collaborations between 
the disciplines. In Part II we set out the essence of our claim: the academic 
lawyerʼs contribution is to take insights from multiple disciplines and, by 
using the skills of analogical argument, apply them in ways that expand the 
boundaries of economic thinking. Part III sets out several examples of past 
law-and-economics scholarship that support our claim. We speculate in the 
Conclusion that lawyers may not continue play as significant a role in the 
next generation of law-and-economics scholarship. Whether this is seen as 
a loss or as the healthy maturation of the field turns on the question we 
pose: are lawyers more than a resource for economists studying the law? 
While we cannot prove the affirmative—either by legal burdens of proof 
or by statistical significance—we do hope to shift the intellectual burden of 
proof going forward. 
I. The Separate Disciplines of Economics and Law 
Multidisciplinary research exists because the academy has been parti-
tioned into disciplines, departments, and schools. Distinctions between ac-
ademic disciplines result more from history, economic forces, and incre-
mental decisions of individual institutions than from deliberate, collective 
boundary-setting. The concept of disciplines arose when research univer-
sities were established in the U.S. in the 1800s, after which professional 
associations and journals soon followed. Most traditional disciplines have 
remained relatively constant since then, even as fields emerged to focus on 
a newly important topic (such as gender), a new medium (such as film) or 
a new approach across disciplines (such as statistics or data science). There 
is thus a path-dependency to disciplinary boundaries that may not reflect 
an efficient organization of the research enterprise.  
Fundamentally, disciplines consist in distinctive ways of thinking, 
communicating, and operating. Each discipline develops its own dis-
course—for example, “positivism” means something different for a legal 
academic than for a philosopher or an economist.8 For these reasons, it has 
been difficult for universities to develop, and even more difficult to main-
tain, a true interdisciplinary scholarly tradition. Moreover, a melded disci-
pline like law-and-economics is seen quite differently by adherents of the 
respective parent disciplines. In light of these challenges, the law-and-eco-
nomics movement has been a great success.  
Scholars have created various taxonomies of academic disciplines. 
Anthony Biglanʼs framework divides academic disciplines along two di-
mensions: (1) ‘hard’ or ‘paradigmatic’ disciplines that specify problems for 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 8. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CALIF. L. 
REV. 815 (1990); Avery Wiener Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Economics, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 2229 (1996). 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 38:707 2021 
712 
study and methods to be used (e.g., physics) versus ‘soft’ or ‘pre-paradig-
matic’ disciplines where paradigms aren’t clearly delineated (e.g., most of 
the social sciences); and (2) pure or theoretical disciplines (e.g., mathemat-
ics and philosophy) versus ‘applied’ disciplines (e.g., engineering and fi-
nance).9 Using these criteria with respect to interdisciplinary studies in law 
and economics, law appears to be the softer and more applied discipline, 
at least in the academy.10 Some scholars view economics as defined by a 
unique approach or set of tools,11 as opposed to law, which is a discipline 
defined by its subject matter. According to this view, the marriage of the 
two is therefore the application of economic tools to the subject matter of 
law.  
A more nuanced analysis results, however, from a brief review of the 
intellectual histories of both economics and law over the past one hundred 
years, which we provide in the next two Sections. 
A. What Is Economics? 
An adequate description of the progression of economic thought 
would fill many volumes; we certainly cannot do it justice in a page or two. 
For our purposes, it may be useful to outline in very broad strokes a few of 
the distinctive stages of its history.  
“Classical” economics first emerged in 1776 with Adam Smith’s 
Wealth of Nations, which studied the genesis of wealth and its distribution. 
Over the next century, however, “political economy” remained less than a 
full discipline. Most academic institutions (especially American) offered 
little instruction, partly due to perceived tensions with certain contempo-
rary principles of theology and moral philosophy. Economics was often 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 9. Anthony Biglan, The Characteristics of Subject Matter in Different Academic Areas, 
57 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 195 (1973); Anthony Biglan, Relationships Between Subject Matter 
Characteristics and the Structure and Output of University Departments, 57 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
204 (1973). Biglan places economics near the middle of the spectrum, but closer towards the pure 
or theoretical disciplines—engaging with “living systems” (e.g., biology) versus “non-living sys-
tems” (e.g., history). Law is not discussed in his article, but presumably it falls toward the soft and 
pre-paradigmatic and leans towards applied on the theoretical-applied dimension. Another frame-
work is proposed by David Kolb, who categorizes disciplines as abstract or concrete on the one 
hand and active or reflective on the other hand. On the one hand, abstract disciplines emphasize 
concepts and theories; concrete disciplines focus on “experiences.” On the other hand, active dis-
ciplines revolve around experimentation; reflective disciplines make general observations about 
the world. David A. Kolb, Learning Styles and Disciplinary Differences, in THE MODERN 
AMERICAN COLLEGE: RESPONDING TO THE NEW REALITIES OF DIVERSE STUDENTS AND A 
CHANGING SOCIETY 232 (1981).  
 10. Of course, there are branches of scholarship in law schools that are theoretical. In-
deed, they have come under public criticism from jurists and lawyers for being too abstract to be 
useful to them. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education 
and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 37 (1992) (criticizing the predominance of “im-
practical scholars” at elite law schools). 
 11. Nobel Laureate in Economics Gary Becker wrote, for example, that “what most dis-
tinguishes economics as a discipline from other disciplines in the social sciences is not its subject 
matter but its approach.” GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 
5 (1976). 
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treated as a subdivision of history, law, mathematics, or even literature. 
Research was neither abundant nor specialized, and the discipline’s bound-
aries were vague. 
Economics found its place as a discipline in its own right in the late 
19th century, when Alfred Marshall and marginalist theory produced the 
“neoclassical” paradigm, which soon predominated. The new theories 
shifted focus from economic growth and capital to efficiency and price. 
This coincided with a surge in societal interest in economic theory, as the 
expansion of industrial capitalism presented new social problems, and new 
universities opened free of ecclesiastical control and the rigidity of a “clas-
sical” education. During this period, economics became more generalized 
and rigorous and gained respect as a science. 
After World War I, “institutional” economics flourished as an alter-
native to the neoclassical model. It rejected the prevailing abstract theories 
and emphasized that social and legal institutions influence economic be-
haviors through constraints and incentives; that existing institutions did not 
work to societal advantage and caused market failures; and that these de-
ficiencies were the product of policy choices. Institutional economics 
seemed, however, to fall short of developing a systematic theoretical core 
or generalized insights, and its expansion was limited by a lack of technical 
rigor.  
Mathematical economics developed in the 1930s, largely due to the 
work of influential American economists such as Irving Fisher, Milton 
Friedman, and Paul Samuelson, and a similar group at the London School 
of Economics. Their research was revolutionary in two ways. First, it trans-
formed Marshallʼs insights into a mathematical model that utilized basic 
maximization and minimization under constraints. And second, it devel-
oped a powerful general equilibrium theory (previously, each market had 
been studied separately). When the mathematical school allied themselves 
with scholars in econometrics, economics adopted the character of a 
“hard” discipline.12 
Next, Keynes’s work on monetary theory and business cycles revolu-
tionized macroeconomics, which otherwise had not changed since margin-
alist theory. He, too, was inspired by his times: the observed reality of the 
Depression-era economy was incompatible with orthodox thinking and 
called for new theories. Keynes opposed mathematical economics and 
econometrics, but later scholars mathematized his theories nevertheless, 
and by integrating microeconomic insights they created the “winning” ne-
oclassical-Keynesian synthesis.  
At the end of the day, the developments that ultimately survived to 
make up the core of modern economics were: (1) mathematical modeling 
in microeconomics, (2) “Keynesian” discourse in macroeconomics, and (3) 
econometrics as the empirical arm of both. Beginning in the 1960s and 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 12. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
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1970s, economics brought these three tools to the study of law and legal 
institutions. 
B. What Is Academic Law? 
Academic law is a much younger discipline than economics, having 
fully separated from the practicing bar only in the past 50 years.13 Though 
English universities first taught law in the mid-1700s, the apprenticeship 
model predominated until the law became an established program of uni-
versity training in the latter part of the nineteenth century.14 Once estab-
lished within the university, academic law began to assert itself as a re-
spected discipline. To do so, law framed itself as a formal ‟science” with 
unique methods and a defined object of inquiry: the positive law of a na-
tion-state. This effort began at the Harvard Law School and was spear-
headed by Christopher Columbus Langdell, who served as Dean from 1870 
to 1895. Langdell and his formalist colleagues championed the “case 
method” of legal study: they purported to derive first principles inductively 
from an analysis of judicial opinions that were deemed to be correctly de-
cided.15 The key premise of using decided cases as the unit of analysis was 
the belief that courts reasoned from categories, using doctrines such as 
“consideration” in the law of contracts to reach correct results. The for-
malists thus sought to elevate the study of law to the status of a fully au-
tonomous discipline with distinctive methods that generated predictable 
outcomes.16  
The distance between law as conceived by the formalists, on the one 
hand, and the observed effects of law on society on the other, generated a 
revolution in legal thought in the 1930s, culminating in the Legal Realist 
movement. The Legal Realists advanced a radical theory in opposition to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 13. Prior to 1970, most American law faculties were recruited from the practicing bar, 
and their scholarly pursuits were largely directed at issues of immediate interest to the bar. Though 
there have long been scholars of academic law, their numbers prior to this time were far smaller 
than the number of professors drawn from practice. See John H. Langbein, Scholarly and Profes-
sional Objectives in Legal Education: American Trends and English Comparisons, in 2 PRESSING 
PROBLEMS IN THE LAW: WHAT ARE LAW SCHOOLS FOR? 1, 2-5 (Peter Birks ed., 1996). Today, 
in virtually every accredited law school the faculty is largely if not exclusively recruited from as-
piring academics whose scholarship is principally directed to an academic audience. 
 14. Douglas W. Vick, Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law, 31 J.L. & SOC’Y 163, 
174-77 (2004). There are exceptions, of course. Harvard and William & Mary date their law 
schools to the latter part of the 18th century, and law was one of the original academic disciplines 
Jefferson established at the University of Virginia in 1819.  
 15. Cases that did not fit within the first principles that emerged from this inquiry were 
thus “wrongly decided.” The formalists dominated legal academic thought for nearly 50 years and 
during that time produced the great treatises of American law, but the artificiality of the legal 
fictions created to sustain their system of inflexible rules ultimately led to the rejection of formal-
ism and the emergence of Legal Realism. See Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the Justice Par-
adox, 35 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 329, 337 (1993). 
 16. The prevailing philosophy of the formalist movement was positivism. The law was 
conceived as a deductive system with fundamental premises leading to inevitable conclusions. See 
Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 
451, 453 (1974). 
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the formalist understanding: law is an instrument of social policy and its 
content cannot be found through the relatively sterile analysis of legal texts 
alone. Courts, they asserted, do not reason from categories, they reason 
from principles grounded in social policy to reach an outcome in a partic-
ular case. The resulting legal doctrine was the rationale offered by courts 
once governing policy principles had directed the outcome of the dispute. 
Legal Realism directed attention away from close analysis of cases and 
doctrine to empirical investigations of how the law worked in action, thus 
setting the stage for the subsequent turn to the social sciences.17  
The Legal Realist movement began to wane after the Second World 
War, and the Legal Process theory began to take hold. Here, scholars 
turned away from normative policy analysis to a descriptive account of the 
processes by which law is made. By focusing on the difference between 
courts and other law-making institutions such as legislatures, process schol-
ars developed a set of “neutral principles” designed to direct lawmaking to 
the body best able to resolve a particular issue.18 But once again, a coun-
termovement developed in the 1970s and 80s, growing from the ground-
work laid by the legal realists and led by scholars eager to borrow insights 
from other disciplines to better understand law and its institutions. Law-
and-economics began with the landmark work of Calabresi at Yale and 
Ronald Coase at Chicago, followed quickly by the magisterial efforts of 
Richard Posner.19 But law-and-economics was only one perspective im-
ported from the university during this period. Interdisciplinary studies 
transformed legal studies into a truly applied discipline, one that used the 
insights from multiple disciplines to study the law, including psychology, 
philosophy, sociology, history, and critical theory. 
Many of these other “law-and” approaches developed in opposition 
to the purported explanatory power of the economic analysis of law.20 
While insights from psychology, philosophy, and history have continued to 
shape legal thought into the twenty-first century, law-and-economics has 
remained as the most influential of the perspectives that have shaped legal 
thinking in the new century. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 17. See Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1241-
43 (1985). 
 18. See Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS 
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 18, 24-25 (David Kairys ed., 1982). 
 19. Many other scholars made seminal contributions to law and economics during this 
period. See generally GEORGE L. PRIEST, THE RISE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (2020). 
 20. Particularly trenchant critiques were offered by the Critical Legal Studies movement, 
which drew on continental philosophy in asserting that law was naked politics used by those in 
power to persuade the powerless that the status quo was the natural order of society. Critical legal 
scholars sought to deconstruct legal doctrine so as to unmask the contradictions and incoherence 
of law and thus reveal that law was not separate from ordinary political debate. Mark Tushnet, 
Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1526 (1991). But the half-life of 
critical theory was short, and after less than 15 years it receded due to its inability to offer a positive 
program for the society that would replace the current one. 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 38:707 2021 
716 
This brief history demonstrates both the tension and the oscillation 
between the internal and external perspectives that has long characterized 
the academic study of law. Academic lawyers are committed to an analytic 
method that categorizes and organizes disparate legal doctrines while, at 
the same time, using the perspective of a number of borrowed disciplines—
such as economics, philosophy, or psychology—to build theories that in-
form and interpret those doctrines. As such, academic law is more than just 
a “soft-applied” discipline in Biglan’s typology. Academic lawyers build 
taxonomies that organize legal phenomena and then use the techniques of 
normative argument to propose interpretive theories that explain the func-
tion and logic of institutions that are influenced by legal doctrine.  
C. Differentiating the “Lawyer” and the “Economist” 
Although the foregoing illuminates the historical differences in the 
methods of economics and law, rigid definitions bog down the exercise of 
identifying the “lawyer’s” or “legal academic’s” contribution to law-and-
economics. Should we speak of a researcher’s formal academic training 
(J.D. or Ph.D.), her home school or department within a university (law or 
economics), where she publishes outside of interdisciplinary outlets (law 
reviews or economics journals), or characteristics of her scholarship (such 
as a quantitative or qualitative emphasis)? We have chosen to focus on 
demonstrated skills, while appreciating that this may lead us perilously 
close to tautologies. In doing so, we recognize that some formal economists 
have brought lawyerly skills to law-and-economics. Many believe that 
Ronald Coase fits that definition, as would other economists without for-
mal legal training, especially after undergoing an apprenticeship in a law 
school.21 Similarly, there are a number of lawyers without formal creden-
tials in economics who are self-taught economists. Moreover, there are to-
day many academics with formal training in both disciplines, the best of 
whose work is a fusion of both.22 
If we eschew credentials in favor of skills in categorizing approaches 
as “lawyer-like” or “economic,” can we then sharpen our definition of the 
methodological skills of legal academics? The work of legal academics is 
often akin to that of institutional economics in its focus on the internal 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 21. Two other notable examples of economists who developed into first-rate lawyers are 
Charles Goetz (Virginia) and William Landes (Chicago). 
 22. Because the newer generation of J.D./Ph.D. researchers often combine the conven-
tional skill sets of legal academics and economists, and because their numbers have grown signifi-
cantly in the past decade, we set them aside in this Essay, particularly because most of these schol-
ars focus largely on empirical projects rather than legal or economic theory and thus are properly 
characterized as belonging to the sub-field that Calabresi designates as “the economic analysis of 
law.” See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. 
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structure and operations of institutions such as courts, administrative agen-
cies, and so on.23 In Part II of this Essay, we further develop two types of 
skills that we suggest distinguish legal academics from the old institutional 
economists: multidisciplinary analysis and the common-law method of nor-
mative argument. We suggest that the two are interrelated, perhaps ex-
plaining why legal realism and law-and-economics in particular flourished 
in the U.S. earlier than in civil law jurisdictions. We also elaborate on the 
significance of multidisciplinarity in law school culture and what we mean 
by the common law method as an analytical tool. Then, in Part III, we ex-
plore several examples where law-and-economics analysis has been in-
formed by these two uniquely legal skills, as well as by economic theory or 
econometrics.  
II. The Skills of the Academic Lawyer 
A. How Do Leading Practitioners of Law-and-Economics Characterize 
Their Methodology? 
Henry Manne expressed the conventional view when he described 
law-and-economics as the application of economic tools and methods to 
legal topics.24 Those tools formally model the legal subject matter based on 
the axioms of economic theory in order to frame hypotheses about the ef-
fect of law on human behavior, and then rigorously test those hypotheses 
with econometric techniques. Unsurprisingly, advocates of this view have 
often been skeptical about the contribution of academic lawyers to the en-
terprise. Manne, for example, argued that economics faculties are “better 
situated to do the economics of law than law professors.”25 Were lawyers 
and economists to collaborate in research, he contended that the contribu-
tion of lawyers would only be in “largely explaining to the empiricists fac-
tual issues . . . and legal implications” that they might otherwise miss.26 
George Priest similarly observed that “[t]he lawyer-economist[ʼs] . . . 
education teaches him that his training is obsolete and that the more he 
develops his scientific interest, the more obsolete his basic training—legal 
training—will become.”27 He writes that social scientists studying law have 
an advantage over lawyers because they “are not burdened by the mastery 
of the legal system’s details,” and thus “proceed at a much faster pace and 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 23. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Law and Economics Versus Economic Analysis of Law, 19 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 459, 460 (2011) (“Economics adds the insights of economic science; 
law adds the understanding of complex institutions, politics, and social policies.”). 
 24. Henry G. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, The Future of Law & Economics: A Discus-
sion (George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 08-35, 2008), https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1145421 [https://perma.cc/7RAE-3GH4]. 
 25. Id. at 25. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Priest, supra note 4, at 439.  
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with a much greater range than lawyers.”28 Richard Posner and Henry 
Hansmann have articulated a substantially similar view of law-and-eco-
nomics as applying economic tools to legal knowledge.29 The lawyer’s role 
under this view is limited to providing (and correcting) the economists’ un-
derstanding of the relevant institutional facts.30 
In a recent book, Guido Calabresi provides an alternative frame-
work.31 He begins by drawing a distinction between what he labels as the 
“economic analysis of law” and “law-and-economics.”32 Calabresi observes 
that, of the two approaches, the former has been central, even dominant. 
Practitioners of the former use economic tools to model the legal world, 
and then if their models cast doubt on that world, they seek to reform that 
legal reality.33 In contrast, Calabresi identifies law-and-economics as a bi-
lateral relationship between the two disciplines, in which not only is law 
illuminated by economic insights, but economics itself is challenged by the 
observations of lawyers. Law-and-economics, on this view, begins with an 
agnostic acceptance of the world as the lawyer understands it to be, looks 
at that world from an economic perspective, and asks whether the lawyer 
is describing the world accurately. If so, and economic analysis cannot ex-
plain the world, the lawyer can guide economic theory to make it subtler 
and more nuanced in order to accommodate the world as it is.34 
Calabresi cites the work of Ronald Coase35 as an early example of the 
symbiotic relationship between the two disciplines, in which the analyst 
identifies an inconsistency between the predictions of economic theory and 
the real world and works to revise the theory in that light. Elsewhere, Cal-
abresi adduces examples of law-and-economics scholars introducing be-
havioral insights into economics, as well as their recognition of the essen-
tial questions of values and taste. More generally, Calabresi suggests that 
the lawyer, observing such inconsistencies, can turn to other disciplines for 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 28. George L. Priest, The Increasing Division Between Legal Practice and Legal Educa-
tion, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 681, 682 (1988). 
 29  Posner, supra note 3; Hansmann, supra note 4. 
 30. See Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. 
L. REV. 1325, 1370 (2013) (noting “the failure of both [economic] theorists and empiricists to pay 
sufficient attention to institutional facts,” and particularly the incorporation of inaccurate factual 
assumptions such that “the results of the models cannot be trusted”); see also John C. Coates IV, 
Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 271 (2000) (showing how flawed design impaired economic research on the poison pill and 
other takeover defenses). 
 31. CALABRESI, supra note 2.  
 32. See Miller, supra note 23, at 459-60 (contrasting economic analysis of law and law-
and-economics). 
 33. CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 2-7. Calabresi can be even more trenchant in his view of 
the economic analysis of law: its most aggressive adherents, he suggests, look at the legal world 
from the standpoint of economic theory and upon finding that “the legal world does not fit, pro-
claim the world to be ‘irrational.’” Id. at 2. 
 34. Id. at 3-4; see Miller, supra note 23, at 470. 
 35. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
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explanation or normative evaluation.36 He adds that the lawyer’s under-
standing of legal structures—akin to institutional economics—is essential 
in shaping the best explanation or the most feasible route for any norma-
tive reform.  
The distinction Calabresi draws between the economic analysis of law 
and law-and-economics usefully separates the field on the basis of the law-
yer’s contribution to the intellectual project. The economic analysis of law, 
thus understood, aptly describes a sub-field of law-and-economics that fits 
the conventional views of the lawyerʼs role, as expressed by Manne, Priest, 
Hansmann and others. Indeed, there have been notable contributions to 
our understanding of the effects of legal rules on the social order made by 
scholars using economic tools largely unaided by any methodological con-
tributions from lawyers.37 Here, the lawyer serves primarily as a resource 
for the economic models and the empirical tests that they generate. 
To be sure, the lawyersʼ contribution of factual knowledge should not 
be undervalued. In many instances, legal scholars have significantly ad-
vanced the economic analysis of law by correcting and refining the econo-
mists’ understanding of the law. In their models, economists assume or in-
voke highly stylized characterizations of concepts such as property, 
corporation, or adjudication. For example, some economists define a prop-
erty right as the residual right of control over the subject asset.38 But the 
common law does not see this as a distinctive feature of property, because 
such right can be given by contract. Lawyers focus instead on the more 
important fact that contract rights are in personam (enforceable only 
against parties who consent to the contract) while property rights are in 
rem (enforceable against the world).39 In another vein of scholarship, some 
economists see a corporation (or “the firm”) as a hierarchy that gives own-
ers and their agents the residual discretion over a group of assets, while 
others see the firm as a nexus of contracts.40 Each group misses the im-
portant legal characterization of a corporation as a person, with rights to 
sue and be sued. The appreciation of this aspect of a firm permits the law-
yer to distinguish between a single firm and a corporate group controlled 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 36. Calabresi refers, as an example, to the occasional use of anthropology in a book writ-
ten with Philip Bobbitt. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES: 
THE CONFLICTS SOCIETY CONFRONTS IN THE ALLOCATION OF TRAGICALLY SCARCE 
RESOURCES (1978). In a different context, Kathleen Sullivan wrote that “the regulation of social 
order through a variety of authoritative texts necessarily interacts in a complex and dialectical 
fashion with the content and techniques of the social sciences and humanities.” Kathleen M. Sul-
livan, Foreword: Interdisciplinarity, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1217, 1219 (2002). 
 37. Many of the new generation of J.D./Ph.D. researchers fall into this category.  
 38. See, e.g., OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 5-6 
(1995); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory 
of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 692 (1986).  
 39. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law 
and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 357-59 (2001) (examining the deficiency of conceptions of 
property in law and economics).  
 40. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDNER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); Coase, supra note 35.  
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by a parent holding company, giving rise to the theories of each firm as 
distinct legal entities.41 As a final example, economists studying contract 
theory typically model the central feature of verifiability as a binary char-
acteristic—facts are verifiable or they are not. Lawyers, in contrast, armed 
with a more detailed understanding of litigation, view verification as a 
function of cost and error, accounting for the allocation of burdens of proof 
and opportunities for summary judgments.42 
While lawyers have made significant contributions through their spe-
cialized knowledge of the law, the more interesting phenomenon is what 
Calabresi describes as “law-and-economics,” where lawyers also contrib-
ute distinct methodological skills. We agree with Calabresi that he and 
other lawyers have expanded the reach of economic thinking into areas 
that were traditionally excluded by the strict axioms of rational choice. But 
we further claim that the lawyerʼs contribution to law-and-economics is 
even broader and more lasting than in Calabresi’s description.43 Our chal-
lenge is to show that the analytic and methodological skills of lawyers work 
symbiotically with the techniques of economic theory to both explain and 
rationalize the law. It is that challenge that we take up next. 
B. Multidisciplinarity in the Legal Academy 
The emergence in the 1970s of the ‟law-and” movements from legal 
realism made law schools hubs of multidisciplinary research in universities. 
Law-and-economics is arguably the most successful strain but many other 
disciplines produced influential scholarship and became part of law school 
pedagogy: law-and-history, law-and-psychology, law-and-sociology, law-
and-literature, all developed sub-fields with impressive scholarship, spe-
cialized journals and academic organizations that mentored young scholars 
and convened conferences and symposia. Coexisting with the other multi-
disciplinary approaches in law schools, the methodology, premises, and 
findings of law-and-economics were constantly being challenged and re-
vised by other ‟law-and” perspectives. The fact that law schools with prom-
inent law-and-economics faculty continued to have unified faculty work-
shops, among other events, ensured that the law-and-economics scholars 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 41. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational 
Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000); George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: 
The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 1102 (2004); George Triantis, The Personification and Property of Legal En-
tities, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 190 (Kenneth Ayotte 
& Henry E. Smith eds., 2011). 
 42. See, e.g., Albert Choi & George Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of 
Costly Verification, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2008); Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics 
of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1583 (2005); Robert E. Scott & George G. Tri-
antis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006).  
 43. Calabresi’s focus.is naturally on the areas of law in which he wrote, as ours is on the 
areas in which we are most familiar: contracts, business organizations, and commercial law. 
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not only needed to justify the value of their perspective, but also were mo-
tivated to incorporate the insights of other disciplines into their work. The 
rational-choice assumptions of neoclassical economics, for example, came 
under attack in law schools earlier and more vociferously than in econom-
ics departments. As Kathleen Sullivan observed in a different context, 
“[T]he regulation of social order through a variety of authoritative texts 
necessarily interacts in a complex and dialectical fashion with the content 
and techniques of the social sciences and humanities.”44  
The dialectical process that Professor Sullivan envisaged is evident in 
some of the leading collaborations between legal academics and econo-
mists. In Section III.B below, we discuss the multidisciplinary study of sov-
ereign debt contracts where the pure application of economic theory would 
have missed explanations for some of the boilerplate contract provisions 
that exist. The legal academicsʼ contribution to that work was to bridge the 
predictions of economic theory with legal reality by drawing on methods 
from other social sciences, particularly from both sociology and linguistic 
theory. 
C. The Common-Law Method in Legal Argument 
The common law is a dynamic system that classifies behavior and as-
sociates it with legal consequences: actions, for example, that either do or 
do not constitute breach, trespass, and negligence.45 Although the classifi-
cations come from adjudications in specific cases, the courts are influenced 
by insights from other disciplines. The value of learning from other disci-
plines depends on the lawyer’s ability to use analogical reasoning to dis-
cover relevant connections between the problem under study and seem-
ingly disparate excursions into sociology and political theory. Often 
captured in the phrase “thinking like a lawyer,” this skill embodies the es-
sence of the common law method: it is the ability to extract from particular 
facts the necessary and sufficient general elements, apply those generalities 
to other particular facts and show a correspondence.46  
 Since any two discrete events, A and B, are both similar to and dif-
ferent from each other, a successful analogy requires a finding of relevance. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 44. Sullivan, supra note 36, at 1219 (emphasis added). 
 45. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, What Is Law? A Coordination 
Model of the Characteristics of Legal Order, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 471, 472-74 (2012) (arguing 
the common law provides a normative classification scheme that acts as “common logic” under 
which contracting parties can coordinate their expectations). 
 46. To be sure, there are many aspects to what is generally labeled as “legal reasoning.” 
They include making decisions according to rules, treating certain sources as authoritative, re-
specting precedent, etc. But our focus here is on the analogical reasoning that is characteristic of 
the common law method. For a scientific treatment of analogical thinking see, THE ANALOGICAL 
MIND: PERSPECTIVES FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE (Dedre Gentner et al. eds., 2001); KEITH J. 
HOLYOAK & PAUL THAGARD, MENTAL LEAPS: ANALOGY IN CREATIVE THOUGHT (1995); and 
SIMILARITY AND ANALOGICAL REASONING (Stella Vosniadou & Andrew Ortony eds., 1989). 
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The lawyer needs to show that A and B are relevantly similar and not rel-
evantly different. The relevance of any similarity turns on its generality; 
the claim that it applies to this case and to others as well.47 Relevance thus 
requires access to a governing principle.48  
Here is where the lawyer’s learned skill in normative argument is use-
ful in law-and-economics scholarship. What makes this skill distinctive is 
that legal argument is necessarily adversarial: one analogy is opposed by 
another (or many others). Thus, the academic lawyer borrows the perspec-
tives of other disciplines and deploys them as principles of relevance in 
drawing analogies between the source theories and the problem being 
studied.49 In this way, the lawyer uses both institutional knowledge and 
theories of explanation from diverse disciplines to broaden the scope of a 
hypothesis beyond what the formal tools of the economist might develop 
independently. This, we suggest, is what sympathetic observers mean when 
they say that the lawyer “asks better questions” or “more readily solves 
complex problems” or “better describes policy goals.”50 
Lawyers in the Anglo-American system are trained to be advocates 
and adversaries. The analogical reasoning of the common law is a tool of 
advocacy with which lawyers are intimately familiar. To lawyers, there are 
competing principles justifying either that A and B are relevantly similar 
or that they are relevantly different. While the economist thinks in strictly 
predictive terms that fits the available data best, the lawyer—by profes-
sional instinct—carries the illusion of control. The data omits an important 
variable: her ability to convince the court of the primacy of one guiding 
principle over another. There is what we call (non-pejoratively) a looseness 
in the lawyers’ perspective as compared to the confining rigor of the econ-
omist. Moreover, while the lawyer also works with the data of the common 
law, she frames it within much larger questions of normative principle.51 
As James Boyd White put it, “The lawyer knows that her categories are 
those of argument and judgment, not simple factual descriptions.”52 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 47. For discussion, see, for example, FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: 
A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 52 (2009). 
 48. See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993) (re-
ferring to principles that operate at a low or mid-level of abstraction.); see also Scott Brewer, Ex-
emplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Anal-
ogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996). 
 49. In contrast with the economistʼs methodology, the relevant economic principles are 
developed from the particular details rather than imposed from above by axioms derived from a 
general theory.  
 50. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
 51. See Martha Minow, Marking 200 Years of Legal Education: Traditions of Change, 
Reasoned Debate, and Finding Differences and Commonalities, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2279, 2297 
(2017) (“Through legal tools of contract, tort, property, constitutions, administrative regulation, 
and policy analysis, as well as adversarial and collaborative procedures, lawyers use analytic argu-
ments to connect moral and institutional concerns and to translate interests into deals and deci-
sions.”). 
 52. James Boyd White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN. L. REV. 
161, 202 (1987). As Henry Hansmann wrote to us in his comment on an earlier draft: “American 
law is not . . . a system of rules, but rather a grab-bag of arguments, and their [law students’] skill 
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This observation—that the most careful economic analysis may miss 
larger and more significant issues–has been made before in other con-
texts.53 While empiricists have challenged work published in law reviews as 
violating basic rules of inference,54 lawyer-economists have criticized em-
pirical studies for having missed the forest for the trees.55 As a result, much 
empirical research does not generate useful descriptive or prescriptive les-
sons.56 A similar point may be made with respect to theoretical efforts in 
the economic analysis of law, producing a distinct dialectic between econ-
omists and lawyer academics in which economists focus on what can be 
modeled and measured with available data (the “trees”), while the lawyer 
seeks to yield more valuable positive or normative insights (the ‟forest”).57 
Collaboration between the two professionals, with their distinct perspec-
tives, can enhance the impact of the research enterprise. 
In sum, lawyers contribute more to law-and-economics than their 
knowledge of law and its institutional context. The differences in method-
ology between the two disciplines have been the basis for substantial criti-
cism of law-and-economics over the years. At the same time, they have 
yielded synergies when the contrasting methodologies are brought to-
gether in interdisciplinary work. Lawyers bring a deep-rooted experience 
with multidisciplinary inquiry in the legal academy that improves the accu-
racy of descriptive research and normative recommendations. In collabo-
rations with economists, they also have the instinct to keep the analytical 
focus trained on questions of larger impact, which we argue here is related 
                                                                                                                                                                                
will lie in drawing the right arguments out of the bag . . . . [S]omehow this mode of argument is 
connected to lawyers’ skill in designing social institutions—contracts, corporations, or constitu-
tions—that are admirable in the messy world in which we actually live.” Email from Henry Hans-
mann to Robert Scott (Sept. 13, 2020) (on file with authors). 
 53. Pamela Karlan wrote, “It would be a pity if legal scholarship, like much of contem-
porary political science, were to adopt the view that the only questions worth asking, and the only 
answers worth giving, are quantitative or based on models so highly stylized that they omit the 
messy but important lessons of experience.” Karlan, supra note 1, at 1271. 
 54. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(2002). 
 55. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil 
Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1220 (2013) (“[V]irtually the entire body of Twiqbal empiricism 
misses the forest (e.g., a bottom-line judgment about Twiqbal’s effect on plaintiff access to the 
legal system) for various trees (e.g., isolating and measuring a ‘judicial behavior’ in response to 
the decisions.”). 
 56. David Engstrom describes another important concern: “a move toward use of com-
puter-automated systems to create ever-larger datasets will crowd out qualitative institutional in-
sight—and, more specifically, lawyerly understanding and judgment—in the formation of hypoth-
eses, the construction of data samples, and the coding of variables.” Id. at 1238. Engstrom cites, as 
an “early statement of the perils of ‘naïve empiricism,’” a paper by Willard Hurst in the 1961 Wis-
consin Law Review. Id. at 1238 n.108 (citing Willard Hurst, Perspectives upon Research into Legal 
Order, 1961 WIS. L. REV. 356, 365). 
 57. Lawyers in the law-and-economic school are also aware of related objections from 
critical legal scholars. “The crits have seen hard methods, in technical legal analysis as well as in 
economic analysis of law, not as bad in themselves, but as a vehicle for technocratic imperialism, 
at the expense of participatory modes of decision making.” Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Econom-
ics from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465, 473 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).  
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to the common law method: the analogies that matter derive from norma-
tive principles that serve one’s goals, whether those of one’s clients or the 
public interest. We draw on this use of analogy as argument in Part III to 
explicate differences in the ways that economists and lawyers analyze some 
of the building blocks of our economy, including the relationship between 
formal or legal modes of enforcement and informal or social sanctions, as 
well as the evidence that obsolete and inefficient terms persist in certain 
standardized contracts. 
III. Two Examples of the Legal Method in Law-and-Economics 
Scholarship 
The following examples are presented as exemplars of the contribu-
tions by lawyers to law-and-economics scholarship. By using these exam-
ples, we do not mean to suggest that they are representative in any system-
atic way of the range of contributions that academic lawyers have made to 
the field. But the examples do illustrate what we believe to be essential 
features of the academic lawyerʼs method that creates complementarities 
with the work of economists. The first example illustrates the synergies that 
can result when the two methodologies are joined in a single research pro-
ject. The second example focuses on how the differences in lawyersʼ meth-
odology yield insights that economic methods alone are likely to miss.  
A. Obsolete and Sticky Boilerplate in Large Market Contracting58 
The following example is taken from a decades-long research project 
to which one of us has contributed together with two lawyer-economists. 
Obviously, separating the different skills of the academic lawyer and the 
economist in such a collaboration requires an exercise in imagination. To 
make the illustration sharper, we have distilled the respective contribu-
tions of each party into a single lawyer and a single economist.  
Assume, therefore, that a lawyer and an economist agreed to collab-
orate. After 10 years their research has produced results that have under-
mined the standard economic assumption that sophisticated commercial 
parties are motivated to correct a court’s interpretive mistakes. The re-
search developed empirical evidence that parties in some large multilateral 
markets fail to react to judicial errors in interpreting boilerplate terms and 
are unable readily to convert boilerplate into new and intelligible formula-
tions. The most salient example of this market failure occurred when Ar-
gentina settled with activist creditors who successfully held out from a re-
structuring offer after asserting a novel interpretation of the ubiquitous 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 58. This example is taken from a decades-long research project to which one of us has 
contributed together with two lawyer-economists: Mitu Gulati and Stephen Choi. To make the 
illustration sharper, some of the details of that collaboration have been elevated and others have 
been ignored. 
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pari passu clause found in almost all sovereign debt contracts.59 The re-
search showed that collective action problems, exacerbated by agency costs 
on both sides of the transaction, impaired the efforts of parties in these and 
other large markets to clarify the meaning of boilerplate terms that are 
overlaid with legal jargon.60 The inefficiencies caused by linguistically un-
certain boilerplate offered arbitrage opportunities for activist traders who 
exploited those uncertainties. The empirical data showed that the process 
of modifying obsolete boilerplate terms to correct for these ambiguities or 
uncertainties can take years.  
In time, the research developed additional evidence that the repeti-
tion of standardized terms in boilerplate contracts produces a form of ob-
solescence that presents a particular concern in large markets with network 
effects. Once a term in a network contract becomes obsolete, the cost of 
switching to an optimal term now includes both the cost of creating the new 
solution and the cost of persuading enough other industry participants to 
use the term so as to realize the network efficiencies. Efforts to coordinate 
industry participants are a public good, however, and thus are under-pro-
duced, particularly in markets characterized by large agency costs. Conse-
quently, these standardized contracts will provide efficiencies at the outset 
but freeze inefficiencies as the world changes. But the empirical results also 
showed that coordination in these markets can often be stimulated by the 
intervention of a coordinating entity—a “spider in the web.” One norma-
tive implication, therefore, is that the state should facilitate the coordina-
tion necessary to provide a network-wide solution to the obsolete terms(s). 
In addition, the state, anticipating that obsolete terms will recur as the fu-
ture unfolds, should provide a mechanism for updating the stock of stand-
ard terms in contracts. 
This example illustrates the ways that the collaboration’s success re-
quired the methodological skills of both disciplines. As a baseline, the 
economist contributed his skill and knowledge of economic theory in for-
mulating testable hypotheses. Most importantly, he then deployed rigor-
ous methods of data collection and statistical analysis to support tentative 
conclusions. This contribution by the economist is the independent varia-
ble in this example: a basic assumption of our inquiry is that skills in eco-
nomics are important and essential to the project. The dependent variable 
is the nature of the lawyer’s contribution. To clarify the distinction we seek 
to illustrate, we define the lawyer’s contribution as potentially consisting 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 59. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Com-
mercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1 (2017) [hereinafter Choi, Gulati & Scott, Black Hole Prob-
lem]; Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, Variation in Boilerplate: Rational Design 
or Random Mutation?, 20 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2018) [hereinafter Choi, Gulati & Scott, Var-
iation in Boilerplate].  
 60. Another example was the standard No Recourse clause that had become obsolete 
over time with the introduction of limited liability under state corporate law. Stephen J. Choi, 
Robert E. Scott & Mitu Gulati, Revising Boilerplate: A Comparison of Private and Public Com-
pany Transactions, 2021 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
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of two separate elements: “institutional” skills and “applied analytical” 
skills. Institutional skills include knowledge of the relevant legal doctrines, 
the ability to read and understand the legal implications of key provisions 
in sovereign bond contracts, intimate familiarity with the sovereign bond 
market and deep understanding of the roles of the activist investors, the 
New York bond lawyers, the sovereignsʼ debt managers, and the invest-
ment bankers. Applied analytical skills comprise two interrelated compo-
nents. The first is familiarity with the tools of multiple disciplines that in-
form the study of institutions. The additional analytic component is the 
developed skill of analogical argument that allows a lawyer to draw rele-
vant linkages between propositions in other disciplines and the particular 
case under study.  
The results from this research project illustrate the value of the law-
yer’s knowledge of other disciplines: the capacity to understand and deploy 
theories of explanation other than economics to the problem under inves-
tigation. A number of allied disciplines helped to broaden the frame of the 
investigation. First, the lawyer interviewed a random sample of practicing 
lawyers and other market players to determine what the market believed 
the pari passu clause actually meant, and why, given the outcry, the clause 
had not been deleted or changed. Over 100 individuals were interviewed 
by using the “snowball” technique derived from sociology, and the consen-
sus view of the sample was that no one had any idea where the clause came 
from or what it meant.61 Second, the lawyerʼs familiarity with techniques 
of archival research led to the discovery of the origin and function of pari 
passu clauses when they were introduced in the 19th century. This histori-
cal search suggested that during that period a pari passu clause ensured 
that the bondholder was not subordinated to creditors who could use mili-
tary force to enforce their bonds, an option no longer available today.62 
Finally, the lawyer’s access to linguistic theory led to the recognition that 
repetition of standard language tends over time to degrade the meaning of 
that language, either through rote usage or the overlay of additional words 
that reduce intelligibility.63 The evidence that law firms generate new con-
tracts by asking inexperienced lawyers to make necessary changes to tem-
plates drawn from older deals suggested that these apparently random en-
crustations were made by lawyers during the process of producing 
contracts.64  
The techniques imported from these other disciplines were harnessed 
to discover relevant connections between these seemingly disparate excur-
sions into sociology, linguistics, and history and the problem under study. 
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As noted in Part II, a successful analogy requires a finding of relevance, 
and relevance requires access to the best governing principle.65 Here is 
where applied analytical skills were important to the research project. The 
lawyer’s command of the basic principles of economic theory could be de-
ployed as principles of relevance in drawing analogies between the source 
theories and the problem being studied.66 In this way, the lawyer used ex-
perience gained from institutional knowledge and the access to other the-
ories of explanation to broaden the scope of the hypothesis beyond what 
the formal tools of the economist might develop independently. 
The conclusions that follow from this collaboration were hidden from 
view at the outset even though, once reached, they were fully explicable in 
economic terms. By enriching the standard economic model with insights 
from other disciplines, and clarifying the connections among those disci-
plines, the lawyer made contributions that were necessary in order to reach 
those conclusions and then advance normative claims. 
B. Social Norms and Legal Enforcement 
It is now well appreciated that the legal system coexists and interacts 
with social norms and associated mechanisms for extralegal enforcement, 
such as the termination of repeat transactions and reputational sanctions. 
The contrasting analysis of social norms and extralegal enforcement by 
lawyers and by economists reveals the difference in their respective meth-
odological approaches. Economists stylize these subjects as quantifiable 
and measurable variables. Unencumbered by the logic of economic models 
or statistical regressions, lawyers apply looser analogical reasoning, draw-
ing on legal classifications, to advance the understanding of the relevant 
extralegal mechanisms. While economists may deprecate the lack of rigor 
of the latter approach, it has yielded important insights that economists 
would miss in studying these phenomena. 
Robert Ellickson’s pathbreaking work, Order Without Law, observed 
that ranchers in Shasta County, California, largely disregarded the legal 
rules of trespass and nuisance in assessing responsibility for property harm 
caused by their respective cattle.67 In these domains, this closely-knit com-
munity governed itself by means of informal rules—social norms—that it 
developed without the aid of legal institutions. In his review of Ellickson’s 
book, economist William Fischel wrote that “it presents a case against the 
current methodology of law-and-economics scholarship and advances by 
example a different paradigm.”68 Ellickson’s “eclectic” approach blended 
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economic tools with the analysis of the law-and-society school, yielding in-
sights that would be missed by someone trained in the conventional and 
predominantly quantitative methods of graduate-school economics. Ellick-
son criticized law-and-economics for exaggerating the role that the legal 
system plays in the overall system of social control over human behavior, 
while also criticizing the law-and-society movement for failing to develop 
theories to explain the social norms that developed.69 Ellickson applied the 
tools of welfare economics to explain the findings he obtained by using the 
methods of sociology and anthropology.70 
As a legal academic, Ellickson was able to use his deep understanding 
of the legal system to approach a qualitatively similar system of social con-
trol outside law. In generating a taxonomy of extralegal mechanisms of so-
cial control, he explained informal norms and their enforcement by anal-
ogy to common law concepts: including rules of evidence, choice of law and 
remedies.71 In a subsequent article on norms in the whaling industry, El-
lickson examined the resolution of competitive claims to captured whales 
and, as with trespass and nuisance norms in Shasta, used common law 
property law analogies—such as rules of possession and standards of rea-
sonableness—to organize the extralegal norms, while applying welfare 
economics to justify them.72 
Later law-and-economics scholarship builds on Ellickson’s work to 
examine the interaction between extralegal and legal enforcement and ex-
hibits similar evidence of a distinctive lawyerly contribution. Lisa Bern-
stein’s study of how commercial relations—in the diamond and cotton 
trade—are regulated by informal and formal enforcement adopted a simi-
lar approach, again distinct from that of the economist. In her article on 
cotton trade, for instance, she emphasized the significant impact on behav-
ioral incentives of non-legal sanctions, such as from the loss to a seller’s 
reputation for not performing up to the expectation of its buyer.73 She 
found evidence of such reputational discipline in the qualitative responses 
to her survey from participants in the trade. While her article has been in-
fluential in law-and-economics, it does not specify how the reputational 
mechanism works (how information is transmitted and sanctions meted 
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out). Questions remain: how much of a deviation from expected quality, 
for example, would trigger how much of a failure to deal? An economist 
studying the impact of reputational deterrence would be compelled to 
specify it as a quantitative variable. This lack of specificity, however, al-
lowed Bernstein to contribute important insights—in particular, a plausi-
ble hypothesis of the relationship between the non-legal sanctions and the 
industry’s formal legal system. Like Ellickson, Bernstein combined game-
theoretic analysis with the techniques of sociological inquiry. But, we ar-
gue, the combination was enhanced by the perspective of legal training. 
The way that both Ellickson and Bernstein describe the operation of non-
legal sanctions bears close analogy to the operation of a formal legal sys-
tem, with similar systems of classification, fact-finding, and sanctions. 
A similar observation may be made in contrasting the economistʼs and 
lawyer’s approach to relational contracting. The economic literature on in-
complete contracting regards formal and informal contracting as separate 
phenomena. Its usual focus is either on how parties with incomplete infor-
mation can write formal contracts so that powerful courts can compel effi-
cient trade74 or, in the alternative, on how parties can harness reputational 
constraints and the discipline of repeated dealings to secure voluntary en-
forcement when formal enforcement is ineffective.75 This line of analysis, 
however, pays scant attention to the relationship between the two types of 
enforcement, and particularly how reliance on one type interacts with reli-
ance on the other. The technical load may simply be too much for the eco-
nomic models. 
In contrast, legal scholars working in the law-and-economics tradition 
have analyzed how commercial parties write contracts that combine both 
explicit and implicit contract terms, as well as formal and informal modes 
of enforcement.76 Conceiving of relational contract in this way reveals how 
norms of trust and reciprocity develop as parties who are granted discre-
tion by the broad standards of obligation imposed on them by the formal 
contract mutually adjust to an uncertain future. This richer (and looser) 
conception of relational contracting is not premised on formal contracting 
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giving way to spontaneous self-regulation. Rather, it points to formal con-
tractual requirements establishing an information exchange regime that al-
lows each party to judge reliably the capacities and intentions of the 
other.77 Unencumbered by the formal modeling imperative of quantitative 
variables, the lawyer-led qualitative and analogical examination has ad-
vanced our understanding of relational contracting. More to our point, 
there has been a productive synergy between the alternating tighter and 
looser modes of analysis. 
Our argument here is neither that the lawyer’s methods in law-and-
economics are superior to those of the economists, nor simply that they 
yield valuable insights that might be missed by economists. Lawyers have 
contributed to the understanding of the interaction between informal and 
formal norms and enforcement, and, more to the point, economists have 
made significant contributions by building on them. We suggest that there 
is a dynamic between the looser qualitative classifications advanced by le-
gal scholars and the quantitative modeling and empirical study of econo-
mists, either in sequential publications or in collaborations in coauthored 
works. There is a healthy synergy between the qualitative expansion led by 
the lawyers into new domains of interest or relationships, followed by a 
tightening of analysis by rigorous application of economic methods. 
Conclusion 
Our objective in this Essay is not to retrospectively claim that legal 
academics were indispensable or even principally responsible for the suc-
cess of the interdisciplinary study of law-and-economics. The perspective 
of this Symposium is forward-looking, and so we should specifically ad-
dress the role of lawyers in the future of law-and-economics. Here, we ad-
mit to some pessimism. Much has changed in the structure and priorities 
of universities in the past few decades. In particular, law schools are no 
longer the predominant hub for multidisciplinary and applied or transla-
tional research. Both aspects have been embraced broadly by university 
leadership. This development might be attributed to the greater apparent 
urgency of social problems, universities’ growing financial reliance on phi-
lanthropy and sponsored research, and a bias in favor of the short-term 
returns from applied research. Whatever the reason, research economists 
(especially those in business schools) are engaging in more applied and 
policy work and collaborating increasingly with scholars in other schools 
and disciplines. Lawyers have become less unique in their role as interdis-
ciplinary brokers with “soft” skills. They will continue to be important, 
nevertheless, because of their subject-matter expertise and their contextual 
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knowledge of law and legal institutions. With respect to what we have been 
referring to as their methodological contributions, we believe that, not-
withstanding changes in academic fashion or disciplines, value will remain 
in the expansive perspective of lawyers, rooted in the common law method. 
Should that value be recognized in the academy, it will continue to serve 
as an important complement to scientific economic analysis. 
